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THE AFSCME – STATE OF ILLINOIS NEGOTIATIONS: 
TRAVELING IN UNCHARTED WATERS 
By: Martin H. Malin 
I.  Introduction 
II.  The ILRB’s Decision Concerning Impasse 
III.  Issues Raised by the ILRB’s Decision 
IV.  Moving Deeper into Uncharted Waters 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee Relations 
Report.  It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public 
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the 
public employee collective bargaining statutes. 
I. IERLA Developments 
A. Confidential, Managerial and Supervisory Employees 
II. IPLRA Developments 
A. Arbitration 
B. Duty to Bargain 
C.  Scope of Bargaining 
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THE AFSCME – STATE OF ILLINOIS NEGOTIATIONS: 
TRAVELING IN UNCHARTED WATERS 
By: Martin H. Malin 
Martin H. Malin is Professor of Law and Director of the Institute for Law and the Workplace at IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law.  He has published more than 75 articles and six books, including Public 
Sector Employment: Cases and Materials (West 2004, 2011, 2016), the leading law school casebook on 
public sector labor law.  An arbitrator and mediator, he serves as a Vice President of the National 
Academy of Arbitrators.  He also serves, by appointment of President Obama, as a Member of the 
Federal Service Impasses Panel, which resolves impasses in collective bargaining between federal 
agencies and unions representing the agencies’ employees.  From 1984-86, he was a consultant to the 
Illinois State, Local and Educational Labor Relations Boards and drafted the regulations implementing 
Illinois’s newly enacted public sector labor relations statutes. 
I.  Introduction 
The collective bargaining agreement between AFSCME Council 31 and the State of 
Illinois expired on June 30, 2015.  To describe negotiations for a successor contract 
as contentious would be an understatement.1 The conflict has played out at the 
bargaining table, before the legislature, in the court of public opinion and before 
the Illinois Labor Relations Board and the courts.  Most significantly, on December 
13, 2016, the Illinois Labor Relations Board issued its formal decision finding that 
the parties’ negotiations were at impasse.2 AFSCME and the State have appealed 
the ILRB decision and the appeals have been consolidated in the Fourth District 
Appellate Court.  As this issue went to press, the Fourth District Appellate Court 
stayed the ILRB’s decision.3 Meanwhile, the State has spoken of unilaterally 
implementing its last best offer even though the ILRB expressly disclaimed ruling 
on whether such unilateral implementation would be lawful,4 AFSCME members 
have authorized their bargaining team to call a strike,5 and the State has 
established a web site to recruit replacements in the event of a strike.6 
                                            
1.  The administrative law judge who presided over dueling unfair labor practice charges observed, “[T]hese negotiations 
reflected a battle mindset on both sides of the bargaining table, with each side willing to do what it takes to achieve its bargaining 
goals.” State of Ill. Dept. of Central Mgmt. Servs. and AFSCME Council 31, Nos. S-CB-16-017 & S-CA--16-087, at 242 (ILRB 
ALJ Sept. 2, 2016) (hereinafter State of Ill. ALJ Decision), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Nos. S-CB-16-017 & S-CA--16-087 
(ILRB State Panel Dec. 13, 2016). 
2. State of Ill. Dept. of Central Mgmt. Servs. and AFSCME Council 31, Nos. S-CB-16-017 & S-CA--16-087 (ILRB State Panel 
Dec. 13, 2016) (hereinafter State of Ill. ILRB Decision). 
3. State of Ill v. AFSCME Council 31, 2017 IL App (4th) 160827 (4th Dist. Mar. 1, 2017). 
4. See id. at 3 n.2. 
5. See Kim Geiger, Monique Garcia & Haley BeMiller, AFSCME Oks Strike, Governor Holds Line,  CHI. TRIB., Feb. 24, 2017, 
at 1. 
6. See Kim Geiger, Rauner Recruits Backup Workers, Administration Uses Web to Find Temps Amid Strike Threat, CHI. TRIB., 
Mar. 1, 2017. 
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The AFSCME-State of Illinois negotiations raise numerous issues for which there 
is no controlling Illinois legal authority.  If they continue in the direction in which 
they are heading, the uncharted waters will only get deeper.  Both sides face 
substantial legal risks.  In normal times, such significant legal risk on both sides of 
a dispute leads parties to find compromises to resolve the dispute.  But are we 
currently in normal times? 
In this article, I examine the unsettled legal issues that the parties are facing.  It is 
not my intent to argue that the ILRB erred in its December 13, 2016, 
decision.  Rather, I raise the numerous issues that a reviewing court will have to 
confront.  Similarly, it is not my intent to suggest how any legal issues should or 
will be resolved if the State unilaterally implements and if AFSCME 
strikes.  Instead, my purpose is to catalogue the issues and the competing strains 
of legal analysis to show the high level of legal risk that both sides face. 
Part II recaps the litigation before the ILRB and the ILRB’s decision.  Part III 
discusses the issues raised by the ILRB’s decision.  Part IV discusses the legal 
issues that lie ahead if the State implements its final offer and if AFSCME strikes. 
II.  The ILRB’s Decision Concerning Impasse 
The State-AFSCME collective bargaining agreement expired on June 30, 
2015.7 Negotiations for a successor began on February 9, 2015.8 Over the course of 
negotiations, the parties entered into three “tolling agreements,” under which they 
agreed to negotiate in good faith without a strike or lockout until impasse was 
reached.9 The third such agreement, reached on September 9, 2015, provided, in 
part: 
The parties agree that this agreement will remain in effect until impasse is reached.  The 
parties may mutually agree that impasse exists or, if a dispute exists with respect to the 
existence of an impasse, the parties agree to submit the matter to the Illinois Labor 
Relations Board (“ILRB”).  If the matter is submitted to the ILRB, this agreement will 
remain in effect until the ILRB resolves the issue.10 
On January 8, 2016, the State declared impasse in negotiations and presented 
AFSCME with its last best final offer.11 On January 15, 2016, the State filed an 
unfair labor practice charge alleging that AFSCME failed to bargain in good faith 
because it insisted on continuing to bargain after January 8, refused to agree that 
                                            
7. State of Ill. ILRB Decision at 3. 
8. Id. at 3-4. 
9. Id. at 4. 
10. State of Ill. ALJ Decision at 141. 
11.  Id. at 1. 
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the parties were at impasse, and refused to join the State in seeking ILRB 
determination of whether an impasse existed.  The State sought as a remedy a 
declaration from the ILRB that it was free to unilaterally implement its last best 
and final offer except with respect to those employees in the bargaining units who 
lacked the right to strike and were covered by the interest arbitration procedures 
of Section 14 of the Illinois Public Employees Relations Act (IPLRA).12 On February 
22, 2016, AFSCME filed unfair labor practice charges against the State alleging, 
among other things, that the State breached its duty to bargain in good faith by 
refusing to negotiate after January 8, 2016.13 On March 22, 2016 the ILRB 
Executive Director issued complaints on both sets of charges and consolidated 
them.14 On September 2, 2016, an ILRB Administrative Law Judge analyzed the 
charges in exhaustive detail in a Recommended Decision and Order which totaled 
250 pages plus appendices.  She recommended dismissal of the State’s charge 
against AFSCME, sustaining some of the allegations in AFSCME’s charges against 
the State and dismissal of others.  On December 13, 2016, the State Panel affirmed 
the ALJ in part and reversed her decision in part. 
AFSCME argued that the ILRB did not have jurisdiction over the State’s unfair 
labor practice charge because the charge amounted to a claim that AFSCME 
breached the tolling agreement and the ILRB lacked jurisdiction to enforce a 
collective bargaining agreement.  The ALJ rejected this argument, reasoning that 
the ILRB has “jurisdiction to adjudicate those breaches of contract involving 
conduct so sufficiently lacking in good faith that they amount to a repudiation of 
the collective bargaining process.”15 She found “that the parties bargained over 
how they would conduct themselves during the course of the negotiations and the 
process by which they would continue to bargain.  Refusal to abide by the 
bargained-for process would be a repudiation of the collective bargaining 
process.”16 
The ALJ determined that AFSCME did not repudiate the agreed-on collective 
bargaining process.  Rather, she found that by filing its unfair labor practice 
charge, AFSCME placed the issue of whether the parties were at impasse squarely 
before the ILRB.17 The ILRB State Panel affirmed the ALJ in this regard.18 
                                            
12. Id. at 1. 
13. Id. at 1-2. 
14. Id. at 1, 2. 
15. Id.at 141. 
16. Id. at 142. 
17. Id. at 144-45. 
18. State of Ill. ILRB Decision at 6-7. 
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The ALJ observed that the parties had grouped issues into packages.  She analyzed 
the status of the negotiations package by package.19 With respect to wages and step 
increases, the ALJ found that the parties appeared to be deadlocked because 
AFSCME never wavered from its demand for across-the-board wage increases and 
the State never moved from its position opposed to such uniform 
increases.20 However, the ALJ found that impasse was not legitimate because the 
State had insisted on waiver of employees’ right to pension calculations based on 
their “whole compensation” and because the State breached its duty to provide 
AFSCME with requested information.21 The ALJ found that the State’s insistence 
that bonuses paid under its merit pay and gainsharing proposals not be 
pensionable demanded a waiver of the employees’ right under Illinois Pension 
Code’s provisions governing the State Employees Retirement System to have their 
pensions based on all remuneration defined as wages under the Social Security 
Enabling Act.22 The ALJ found that the State failed to provide AFSCME with 
examples of how its proposed merit pay plan would identify high performers,23 and 
had failed to provide AFSCME with information on its experience developing 
criteria implementing its merit pay plan under its collective bargaining agreement 
with the Teamsters.24  
With respect to health insurance, the ALJ made a similar ruling.  She found the 
parties appeared to be deadlocked but found the deadlock was not a legitimate 
impasse because the State had insisted on waiver of employees’ statutory right to 
subsidized health care during retirement and because the State had breached its 
duty to provide AFSCME with requested information concerning target savings 
generated by various cost-savings initiatives and increases in out-of-pocket 
costs.25 She made a similar finding with respect to a package labeled, “Non-
Discrimination, Upward Mobility Program (UMP) and Filling of Vacancies,” 
finding that the parties’ deadlock was not a legitimate impasse because the State 
had not given AFSCME an opportunity to respond after it provided new 
information the day before declaring impasse.26 
With respect to subcontracting, the ALJ found considerable movement by both 
parties.27 The State had moved from its opening position of an unfettered and 
                                            
19. State of Ill. ALJ Decision at 221. 
20. Id. at 223. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 214-16. 
23. State of Ill. ALJ Decision at 183. 
24. Id. at 184-85. 
25. Id. at 223-25. 
26. Id. at 231-32 
27. Id. at 225-26. 
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unreviewable management right to subcontract toward a proposal for managed 
competition, whereby AFSCME would have the opportunity to bid on work that 
was to be subcontracted and management would review the union’s proposal to 
determine whether it more effectively met the State’s needs than the outside 
bids.28 AFSCME had moved from its position of maintaining the status quo to a 
proposal for a committee to discuss alternatives to subcontracting but maintained 
its desire to retain existing language that limited the State’s ability to select an 
outside bidder based on “efficiency, economy, or related factors.”29 Based on the 
parties’ differing standards, the ALJ concluded that they were at impasse on 
subcontracting: 
While I believe that the parties could get closer to agreement on managed competition 
provision, I find that the State was warranted in assuming that further bargaining would 
be futile.  The State had consistently indicated its unwillingness to agree to language 
limiting its subcontracting decisions based on “efficiency, economy or related 
factors.”  The Union had continued to assert its unwillingness to remove that language 
and on the last day, the parties met, doubled down on that language by including it in the 
provision related to the assessment of the Union’s managed competition proposal.30 
With respect to layoffs and a package labeled “Outstanding Economics,” the ALJ 
found that the parties were not at impasse.31 She made a similar finding with 
respect to Health and Safety issues,32 and Semi-Automatic/Classification In-Series 
Advancement.33 She found that the parties were at impasse on  Vacation, Holiday 
Scheduling and Leaves of Absence;34 Department of Corrections and Department 
of Juvenile Justice issues;35 Mandatory Overtime;36 and Management Rights and 
Check-off/Fair Share.37 
The ALJ addressed the question of what remedy to recommend in light of her 
findings.  She rejected AFSCME’s position that the unremedied unfair labor 
practices required the ILRB to order the parties to resume bargaining as if it were 
January 9, 2016.  She reasoned: 
The Board would certainly be justified if it followed the approach set out by the 
Union.  However, the standard remedy of an affirmative bargaining order on the entire 
                                            
28. Id. at 225. 
29. Id. at 225-26. 
30. Id. at 226.  
31. Id. at 226-28. 
32. Id. at 229-30. 
33. Id. at 233-34. 
34. Id. at 228. 
35. Id. at 228-29. 
36. Id. at 230. 
37. Id. at 232. 
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CBA would likely do little to assist the parties in reaching agreement, which would only 
further deteriorate what labor harmony exists between these parties.38 
The State argued that it should be allowed to implement its last best and final offer 
because the parties were at impasse over a single critical issue.  The ALJ found that 
the parties had reached a legitimate impasse over the single critical issue of 
subcontracting but recommended that the ILRB not adopt the single critical issue 
approach to impasse that had been developed under the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA) in the private sector.  She reasoned: 
Though the Board could find that there was an impasse on one of the three critical issues, 
and that under NLRB precedent, this would presumably allow the State to implement its 
entire last, best, and final offer, I find this remedy is, like the standard remedy urged by 
the Union, extreme when applied to this case.  The parties were at impasse on a large 
number of packages, but they were not at impasse on several others.  If the State were 
able to implement its entire last, best, and final offer, the implications and impact would 
be enormous that, when applied to this case, it would be destructive of the collective 
bargaining process and not serve the statutory mission of the Board.  Therefore, I 
recommend that the Board not adopt the single-issue impasse standard, or at least refuse 
to apply it to this case.39 
Instead, the ALJ recommended that the ILRB allow the State to implement its final 
offer with respect to those packages on which the parties had reached a legitimate 
impasse but resume bargaining on the others.40 She concluded, “[T]his proposed 
remedy most comprehensively protects the rights of both parties preserved by the 
Act, promotes labor harmony by assisting in the efficient resolution of the 
remaining issues, and is an appropriate use of the Board’s broad discretion in 
crafting remedies.”41 
Both parties filed exceptions to the ALJ’s recommendations.  The State Panel 
affirmed the ALJ’s findings that the State had breached its duty to provide 
information.42 It addressed the issue of impasse in connection with AFSCME’s 
charge that the State had refused to bargain in good faith after January 8, 2016, 
the day the State declared impasse.  The State Panel did not engage with the ALJ’s 
rationale for recommending that the State be allowed to implement its final offer 
with respect to packages on which the parties had reached a legitimate impasse but 
be required to resume bargaining on the others.  Instead, the State Panel rejected 
it in conclusory language and adopted the private sector single critical issue 
                                            
38. Id. at 238. 
39.  Id. at 242. 
40. Id. at 244. 
41. Id. 
42. State of Ill. ILRB Decision at 8-9, 15.  
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approach to impasse.43 Consequently, the State Panel held that the State’s unlawful 
refusals to provide information and its insistence on permissive subjects of 
bargaining were irrelevant to the issue of impasse because the information and 
permissive subjects did not concern the issue of subcontracting.44 The State Panel 
declared that the parties had reached a complete impasse.45 
III.  Issues Raised by the ILRB’s Decision 
Typically, an issue of impasse is presented to a labor relations board when an 
employer unilaterally implements its final offer and the union charges that the 
conduct breached the employer’s duty to bargain in good faith.  The employer 
defends claiming that the parties’ negotiations had reached impasse.  If the labor 
board disagrees, it usually orders the employer to restore the status quo ante, 
resume negotiations and make adversely affected employees whole.  If the union 
struck in response to the unilateral implementation, a finding that the parties were 
not at impasse likely means that the strike was caused by employer unfair labor 
practices, depriving the employer of the ability to permanently replace striking 
employees.  In other words, having calculated that negotiations have reached 
impasse, an employer typically acts at its peril in the event it miscalculated. 
In the AFSCME-State negotiations, the State sought an advance ruling from the 
ILRB that the parties were at impasse and that the state could lawfully unilaterally 
implement its final offer.  In essence, the State sought a declaratory ruling from 
the ILRB.  Although the IPLRA confers on the ILRB the authority to adjudicate 
unfair labor practice charges, nowhere does it confer on the agency the authority 
to issue declaratory rulings.  Interestingly, the Florida Public Employment 
Relations Act confers on the Florida Public Employment Relations Commission 
the authority to issue declaratory rulings in situations akin to the situation that the 
State faced.46 The IPLRA, however, contains no comparable provision. 
The State maintained that the ILRB had jurisdiction because under the tolling 
agreement, AFSCME had agreed to join the State in asking the ILRB to resolve the 
question of impasse if the parties were unable to agree.  However, where an 
administrative agency lacks authority to undertake particular action, such as a 
declaratory ruling, parties may not by agreement confer such authority on the 
                                            
43. “[W]e adopt the NLRB’s approach to single critical issue impasse and find that the parties reached single issue impasse on 
the critical issue of subcontracting.  In light of this analysis, we decline to adopt the ALJ’s package-by-package approach to 
determining the existence of an impasse and her proposed remedy of partial implementation to which both parties strenuously 
objected.” Id. at 16. 
44. Id. at 20-21.  
45. Id. at 16. 
46. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 427.207(7); see Dist. 2A Transp., Tech., Warehouse & Service Employees Union v. Canaveral Port Auth., 
24 Fla. Pub. Emp. Rpr. ¶ 29,288 (Fla. P.E.R.C. 1998).  
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agency.  Only the legislature by statute may confer authority on an administrative 
agency.47 
The ALJ held that the ILRB had jurisdiction because AFSCME would have 
breached its duty to bargain in good faith if it had repudiated the tolling 
agreement.  She further found that AFSCME did not repudiate the tolling 
agreement because AFSCME itself raised the issue of impasse by filing its own 
unfair labor practice charge contending that the State breached its duty to bargain 
by cutting off negotiations on January 8, 2016.  In the ALJ’s view, this placed the 
issue of impasse before the ILRB.  The State Panel affirmed the ALJ on this point, 
but neither addressed the agency’s lack of authority to issue declaratory rulings 
and the inability of parties to confer on an agency authority to do something that 
the legislature has not empowered the agency to do.  Because the IPLRA does not 
give the ILRB authority to issue declaratory rulings, had AFSCME not filed its 
unfair labor practice charge, it is doubtful that the ILRB would have had 
jurisdiction over the State’s charge. 
Having decided that AFSCME’s unfair labor practice charge placed the issue of 
impasse before the ILRB, the ALJ proceeded to declare the matters on which the 
State was privileged to implement unilaterally.  The State Panel wisely chose not 
to go down that road.  Rather, the State Panel considered the State’s claim of 
impasse as, in effect, a defense to AFSCME’s charge that by ceasing negotiations 
on January 9, 2016, the State breached its duty to bargain.  The State Panel 
sustained the defense but then simply dismissed AFSCME’s charge in this 
regard.  The State Panel did not declare whether the State could lawfully 
unilaterally implement all or any part of its final offer. 
The State Panel’s decision is now before the Illinois Appellate Court, which has 
stayed the ILRB’s decision.48  The court will have to decide whether the State Panel 
appropriately opted to reject the ALJ’s recommendation and instead to apply the 
NLRA doctrine of impasse driven by a single critical issue.  As observed above, the 
State Panel did not engage with the ALJ’s reasoning.  It simply relied on and 
applied NLRA case authority. 
The Appellate Court will have to consider strong arguments that the State Panel 
erred in applying the private sector single critical issue doctrine.  Although NLRA 
precedent in some circumstances may provide appropriate persuasive authority 
for interpreting the IPLRA, there are strong reasons as to why this was not one of 
                                            
47. See Lesner v. Police Board of the City of Chicago, 2016 IL App. (1st) 150545 at ¶ 22, 55 N.E.3d 1206, 1213 (1st Dist. 2016) 
(“Administrative agencies . . . exercise purely statutory powers and possess no inherent or common-law powers.”). 
48. State of Ill. v. AFSCME Council 31, 2017 IL App (4th) 160827 (4th Dist. Mar. 1, 2017). 
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those circumstances.  The purposes behind the NLRA and the IPLRA are not 
identical.  As the Nebraska Supreme Court observed in declining to follow NLRA 
precedent in determining the scope of protected concerted activity under the 
Nebraska public sector labor relations law observed: 
The Act has a somewhat different focus than the NLRA. Although couched in broad 
Commerce Clause language, the NLRA attempts to rectify the “inequality of bargaining 
power between employees ... and employers” by providing certain rights to employees. 
The Act, on the other hand, focuses almost exclusively on protecting the public.49 
Similarly, the legislative findings justifying enactment of the IPLRA do not 
mention a need to equalize bargaining power.  However, they do include: 
It is the purpose of this Act to prescribe the legitimate rights of both public employees and 
public employers, to protect the public health and safety of the citizens of Illinois, and to 
provide peaceful and orderly procedures for protection of the rights of all.50 
In many respects, the IPLRA was modeled on the comparable Pennsylvania statute 
rather than the NLRA.51 In Philadelphia Housing Authority v. Pennsylvania 
Labor Relations Board,52 the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, the 
intermediate appellate court in that state, upheld a Pennsylvania Labor Relations 
Board (PLRB) decision that a public employer in that state may not unilaterally 
implement its final offer even when the parties have reached an impasse in 
negotiations.  Rather, unilateral implementation may occur only in response to a 
work stoppage by the union.  The court quoted favorably the PLRB’s analysis: 
[I]t would not serve the legislature’s declared goal of promoting orderly and constructive 
relationships between public employers and their employees through good faith collective 
bargaining to allow a public employer to implement its final offer when the employees in 
the unit have not disrupted the continuation of public services by striking.  Unilateral 
action by an employer during a period of no contract while employees continue to work 
serves to polarize the process and would encourage strikes by employees who otherwise 
may wish to continue working under the terms of the expired agreement while 
negotiations continue.53 
The holding of the court in Philadelphia Housing Authority came before the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2013 when, four years after its collective 
bargaining agreement with AFSCME District Council 33 expired, the City of 
                                            
49. Omaha Police Union Local 101 IUPA v. City of Omaha, 736 N.W.2d 375, 384 (Neb. 2007). 
50. 5 ILCS 315/2. 
51. See Central City Educ. Ass’n v. IELRB, 149 Ill. 2d 512, 599 N.E.2s 892, 900 (1992) (“Notably, the legislature used the 
Pennsylvania experience as a model in creating the Act, and the Pennsylvania courts' interpretation of the statute is relevant to 
any analysis of the Act.”) 
52.  620 A.2d 594 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). 
53. Id. at 600. 
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Philadelphia applied to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for extraordinary relief 
alleging that because the union had not struck, the city was precluded by the 
decision in Philadelphia Housing Authority from implementing its final 
offer.  With the Chief Justice dissenting, the court denied the application.54 The 
dissent maintained, among other things, that Philadelphia Housing Authority was 
not a binding precedent because, of the seven justices who decided the case, two 
concurred in the result only and two dissented.55 The court majority, however, 
apparently did not see it that way. 
The rationale behind the Pennsylvania approach of not allowing unilateral 
implementation even after reaching impasse is recognition of the high likelihood 
that unilateral implementation will provoke a strike.  Allowing such provocation, 
according to the Pennsylvania authorities, is inconsistent with the legislative 
policies underlying the Pennsylvania public sector collective bargaining 
statute.  Those legislative policies, which emphasize protection of the public 
through peaceful and orderly procedures, are comparable to the legislative policies 
declared in the IPLRA. 
The Pennsylvania approach prohibiting unilateral implementation even after 
bargaining to impasse is controversial.  The dissent in the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court and the dissent in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court feared 
that prohibiting an employer from implementing unilaterally after impasse 
empowers a union to forestall forever concessions necessary in times of fiscal 
strain by not striking.56 But the Illinois Appellate Court need not go as far as 
prohibiting unilateral implementation following impasse to reverse the ILRB State 
Panel.  The court can reject the State Panel’s adoption of the single critical issue 
doctrine from private sector labor law as inconsistent with the IPLRA’s policies but 
leave open the possibility of unilateral implementation based on impasse in the 
negotiations as a whole.  As long as the possibility of progress being made on other 
issues exists, the court could hold, it is contrary to the statutory policy to allow the 
employer to implement unilaterally merely because there does not appear to be 
progress on one key issue.  Indeed, in my experience mediating public employee 
collective bargaining negotiations,57 I have found when the parties’ positions on 
one particular issue seem to have hardened it can be useful to move to other issues 
                                            
54. City of Philadelphia v. AFSCME District 33, 68 A.3d 323 (Pa. 2013). 
55. Id. at 324-25 (Castille, C.J. dissenting).  
56. Id. at 325-26 (Castille, C.J. dissenting); Philadelphia Housing Auth., 620 A.2d at 601-02 (Collins, J. dissenting). 
57. I have mediated public employee negotiations in Illinois, most recently the 2015-16 negotiations between the Chicago 
Board of Education and the Chicago Teachers Union as well as federal sector collective negotiations while serving by 
appointment of President Obama as a member of the Federal Service Impasses Panel. 
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and if significant progress is made on other issues, the momentum can spill over 
to soften positions on the most difficult issue. 
The court may also decide that even if the single critical issue doctrine is 
compatible with the IPLRA’s policies, it should not be applied to the State’s 
negotiations with AFSCME.  The court can reach this conclusion in at least two 
different ways.  First, the court can look to the key NLRB decision on which the 
State Panel relied, CalMat Co.,58 and find it inapplicable to the State-AFSCME 
negotiations.  In CalMat, among the issues in dispute was an employer proposal to 
eliminate the fixed hourly pension plan contribution rate.  The union opposed this 
proposal and the union’s chief negotiator told the employer that “unless [the 
employer] took its proposal to eliminate the fixed contribution rate off the table, 
there would be no movement on any other issue.”59 The NLRB found that the 
parties were at impasse on pension contributions, which was a single critical issue 
that justified the employer implementing its final offer.  The Board defined the 
burden on the party asserting impasse based on a single critical issue to 
demonstrate: 
first, the actual existence of a good-faith bargaining impasse; second, that the issue as to 
which the parties are at impasse is a critical issue; third, that the impasse on this critical 
issue led to a breakdown in the overall negotiations—in short, that there can be no 
progress on any aspect of the negotiations until the impasse relating to the critical issue 
is resolved.60 
In finding that the parties were at impasse over the single critical issue of pensions, 
the NLRB pointed to statements by the union’s chief negotiator that he would not 
put forth any further proposals until the employer moved off its pension proposal 
and his concurrence with the employer’s chief negotiator’s assessment that the 
parties were hung up on the pension issue.61 Thus, it was clear from the parties’ 
statements and actions that the impasse on pensions precluded progress on any 
aspect of the negotiations until the impasse was resolved.  Similarly, in Richmond 
Electrical Services, Inc.,62 two members of the NLRB, over a dissent by then-Board 
Member (later Chairman) Wilma Liebman, held that the parties were at impasse 
because of the single critical issue of wages.  Although there is no mention in the 
Board’s opinion of a statement by union negotiators that they would refuse to 
negotiate further until the employer dropped its wage proposal, the Board 
effectively inferred such because of the presence of a most favored nations clause 
                                            
58. 331 N.L.R.B. 1084 (2000). 
59. Id. at 1092. 
60.  Id. at 1097. 
61. Id. at 1099. 
62. 348 N.L.R.B. 1001 (2006). 
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in the union’s other contracts, including its multi-employer contract with the 
National Electrical Contractors Association.  The Board majority observed: 
In this case, the Union conceded that the most-favored-nation clauses in the Union's 
other collective-bargaining agreements effectively precluded it from agreeing with the 
Respondent on a wage that was lower than the one in the NECA agreement[.]  If the Union 
agreed to grant the Respondent a lower wage than the NECA wage, the Union would have 
had to offer the lower wage to 64 other electrical contractors with whom it had contractual 
relations. Thus, a lower contractual wage for the Respondent's small number of 
bargaining unit employees would have lowered the wages that hundreds of union 
members would earn at other local electrical contractors.63 
In contrast, in Atlantic Queens Bus Corp.,64 the employer insisted on a most 
favored nations clause and stated it would never agree to a contract without one 
and the union stated it would never agree to a contract containing one.65 Finding 
that even if the parties were at impasse with respect to the most favored nations 
clause, they continued to make progress with respect to wages, the Board 
concluded that they were not at impasse under the single critical issue doctrine 
because “the record does not permit a finding that as of the afternoon of March 19, 
the parties were unable to make further ‘progress on any aspect of the 
negotiations.”66 
For the Illinois Appellate Court to affirm the State Panel, it must do what the State 
Panel failed to do – engage with the ALJ’s findings that apart from their positions 
with respect to subcontracting, the parties were still making progress on several 
other issues.  The Appellate Court will also have to engage with the ALJ’s reasoning 
behind her recommendation that the single critical issue doctrine not be applied 
to the State-AFSCME negotiations.  The Appellate Court could hold that the State 
Panel erred in finding that the single critical issue doctrine’s requirements were 
met in this case and reverse the State Panel on that basis. In granting a stay of the 
ILRB’s decision, the Appellate Court seemed to favor this approach.67 
Second, the Appellate Court will also have to evaluate the impact of the State’s 
unfair labor practices of failing to provide AFSCME with relevant information and 
insisting on permissive subjects of bargaining.  The State Panel found that those 
unfair labor practices were irrelevant to the question of impasse because the 
information did not pertain to the single critical issue of subcontracting.68 Those 
                                            
63. Id. at 1002. 
64. 362 N.L.R.B. No. 65 (2015). 
65. Id. at 2. 
66. Id. at 3 (quoting CalMat Co., 331 N.L.R.B. at 1097). 
67. State of Ill. v. AFSCME Council 31, 2017 IL App (4th) 160827, slip op. at 5, (Mar. 1, 2017). 
68. State of Ill. ILRB Decision at 21-22. 
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unfair labor practices related to the critical issues of wages and health 
insurance.  The Appellate Court will have to determine whether, in light of 
unremedied unfair labor practices with respect to two core issues, it can be said 
that the impasse over the single critical issue of subcontracting meant that the 
parties were unable to make further progress on any aspect of the 
negotiations.69  The Appellate Court will also have to decide whether finding 
impasse based on a single critical issue when there are unremedied unfair labor 
practices with respect to other core issues is consistent with the IPLRA’s policy “to 
protect the public health and safety of the citizens of Illinois, and to provide 
peaceful and orderly procedures for protection of the rights of all.”70 It could 
conclude that, even accepting the NLRB’s single critical issue doctrine, the doctrine 
should not be applied where the employer has committed unfair labor practices 
that potentially impeded negotiations on other critical issues. 
The Illinois Appellate Court could also decide to defer to the ILRB State Panel’s 
administrative expertise and judgment balancing the competing interests at stake 
in the case.  Should it do so, it likely will affirm the State Panel.  Although the 
Appellate Court’s analysis in its opinion granting the stay makes this doubtful, my 
point is that the State Panel’s decision has not alleviated the substantial legal risks 
both parties face.  It has merely moved them to another level.  It is also very likely 
that whichever party does not prevail in the Appellate Court will seek review in the 
Illinois Supreme Court. 
IV.  Moving Deeper into Uncharted Waters 
As previously discussed, the State Panel reached the issue of impasse in the context 
of resolving AFSCME’s charge that the State violated the IPLRA by refusing to 
negotiate after January 9, 2016.  In effect, the State Panel found that the State had 
sustained its affirmative defense that it was not required to continue negotiations 
because the parties were at impasse.  The State Panel expressly disclaimed 
determining whether the State was legally allowed to implement all or part of its 
final offer. 
The State has indicated its intent to implement its final offer unilaterally.  Doing 
so will be fraught with legal risk.  Illinois legal authority concerning employer 
unilateral implementation of a final offer is sparse and non-determinative. 
                                            
69. See id., at 13. 
70. 5 ILCS 315/2. 
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Under the NLRA, an employer may implement its final offer unilaterally following 
an impasse in negotiations.71 The ALJ cited AFSCME Local 3464 and City of 
Peoria,72 as applying this private sector rule under the IPLRA.  City of Peoria arose 
out of negotiations between the union and the city over the accretion to an existing 
bargaining unit of three job titles held by four employees.  The city declared 
impasse and implemented its final offer and the union filed unfair labor practice 
charges.  The ALJ recommended dismissing the charges because the union failed 
to prove that the city had effected any material change in the employees’ wages, 
benefits or working conditions.  As an alternative, in the event that the Board 
disagreed with this conclusion, the ALJ recommended that the Board dismiss the 
charge because the parties had bargained to impasse thereby allowing the city to 
implement its final offer.  The Illinois State Labor Relations Board (ISLRB), the 
predecessor agency to the ILRB State Panel, simply accepted the ALJ’s 
recommendation and adopted it as a decision of the Board.  Thus, the ALJ’s 
alternate recommendation that the city could lawfully implement its final offer 
because the parties were at impasse is dicta and dicta from an ALJ is hardly binding 
precedent on which parties should rely. 
The ALJ in City of Peoria cited County of Jackson,73 and Illinois Departments of 
Central Management Services and Corrections,74 for the proposition that an 
employer may unilaterally implement following a good faith impasse.  Neither case 
so holds.  In County of Jackson, a group of employers bargaining together declared 
impasse and unilaterally implemented.  The ISLRB hearing officer found that they 
were not at impasse and violated the IPLRA when they implemented.  On 
exceptions to the ISLRB, the employers argued that several of them were necessary 
parties and were not joined in the unfair labor practice charge.  The ISLRB rejected 
that position and adopted the hearing officer’s recommended order.  Thus, the 
ISLRB never ruled expressly on whether an employer may implement following 
impasse.  The hearing officer in County of Jackson relied on Corrections for the 
proposition that an employer may implement following a good faith impasse in 
negotiations.  However, in Corrections, the ISLRB held that the employer could 
unilaterally impose drug testing on corrections officers because the decision to do 
so was not a mandatory subject of bargaining, but that the employer committed an 
unfair labor practice by unilaterally implementing its position with respect to the 
disciplinary consequences of a positive drug test because the parties were not at 
impasse in their effects bargaining. 
                                            
71. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). 
72.  11 PERI ¶ 2007 (ISLRB 1994). 
73. 9 PERI ¶ 2040 (ISLRB 1993). 
74.  5 PERI ¶ 2001 (ISLRB 1988), aff’d, 190 Ill. App. 3d 259, 546 N.E.2d 687 (1989). 
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In Corrections, the ISLRB cited the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board’s 
(IELRB’s) decision in Kewanee Education Association and Kewanee Community 
Unit School District No. 229,75 for the proposition that an employer may 
unilaterally implement following impasse.  However, in Kewanee the IELRB 
found that the employer violated the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act by 
implementing its final offer before the parties had reached impasse in 
negotiations.  In other words, there simply is no Illinois authority upholding an 
employer’s unilateral implementation with respect to a mandatory subject of 
bargaining based on a bargaining impasse.  On the other hand, the labor board and 
the courts in Pennsylvania have held that an employer violates that state’s statute, 
a statute which served as a model for the IPLRA, if an employer unilaterally 
implements following impasse unless the union has gone on strike. 
If the State unilaterally implements its final offer, the parties will be traveling in 
uncharted legal waters.  The ILRB and the courts will have to choose from among 
the Pennsylvania approach of not allowing unilateral implementation unless there 
is a work stoppage, the NLRA approach of allowing unilateral implementation 
following a good faith impasse, or the ALJ’s approach of allowing partial 
implementation.  The stakes for both parties will be high.  For example, the State’s 
final offer includes major changes to health insurance, which impose significant 
additional costs on bargaining unit members.  If the unilateral implementation is 
held unlawful, the State will be liable to make those employees whole for their 
losses.  If the implementation is held lawful, the bargaining unit members will have 
to bear the additional costs. 
The legal risks that both parties face go beyond the question of whether, and if so 
under what circumstances, an Illinois public employer may unilaterally implement 
following an impasse in negotiations.  Impasse is not a static state.  A party may 
take action that breaks an impasse and revives the other party’s duty to 
negotiate.  On January 9, 2017, AFSCME presented a new proposal to the State 
which included a freeze on base wages for the life of the contract, immediate 2.5% 
increase in employee contributions to health insurance followed by 3% increases 
in the next two fiscal years, increases in copays and deductibles, bonuses paid to 
all employees in amounts equal to the pool of bonus money proposed by the State 
to be awarded based on merit, and step increases in the last two years of the 
contract.76 If the State declines to resume negotiations or unilaterally implements 
its final offer, we can expect AFSCME to file new unfair labor practice charges 
claiming that its new offer broke the impasse.  A final resolution of such charges is 
                                            
75. 4 PERI ¶ 1136 (IELRB 1988). 
76. Letter from AFSCME Executive Director Roberta Lynch to Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner (Jan. 9, 2017), available 
at http://www.afscme31.org/pdfs/FairFramework.pdf. 
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likely to be years away as they would have to first be litigated before an ILRB ALJ, 
then before the State Panel and then before the Illinois Appellate Court with a 
likely petition for review to the Illinois Supreme Court. 
Meanwhile, AFSCME members have authorized the bargaining team to call a 
strike.  If a strike ensues, it will elevate the legal risks on both sides.  If AFSCME 
ultimately prevails in its unfair labor practice charges, the strike would likely be 
deemed an unfair labor practice strike.  Under private sector precedent, the State 
would be precluded from permanently replacing the strikers.  On the other hand, 
if the State ultimately prevails on the legal issues, under private sector precedent 
the State would be allowed to permanently replace the strikers.  But since Illinois 
has never had a case of a public employer permanently replacing strikers, we can 
only speculate as to whether the ILRB and the Illinois courts would adopt private 
sector law concerning replacement.  Indeed, even temporary replacement of 
strikers in the Illinois public sector has been rare.  It was attempted in 1987 during 
the strike by teachers in the Homer School District in Champaign County and failed 
miserably.77 
A strike in the private sector is designed to exert economic pressure on the 
employer by curtailing production and, thereby, reducing employer revenues.  In 
the public sector, by contrast, a strike does not relieve members of the public from 
paying taxes.  Thus, the primary pressure exerted by a strike is political, rather than 
economic.  A strike by AFSCME against the state would be unprecedented.  Both 
parties would vie for public support and each would try to exert political pressure 
on the other in an environment less than two years before the next gubernatorial 
and legislative elections.  We can also expect the State to try to break the solidarity 
of AFSCME-represented bargaining unit members and lure them to cross the 
picket lines to return to work and we can expect AFSCME to work hard to maintain 
worker solidarity. 
Unilateral implementation by the State and a strike by AFSCME would occur in an 
environment marked by extremely high levels of legal and political risk.  Only time 
will tell whether the pressure generated by such risks will provide the incentive 
needed for both parties to reach a deal, or whether the parties will continue with 
what the ALJ characterized as a “battle mindset . . . with each side willing to do 
what it takes to achieve its bargaining goals.”78 
                                            
77. See Martin H. Malin, Two Models of the Right to Strike, ILL. PUB. EMP. REL. REP. Winter 1990 at 1. 
78. State of Ill. ALJ Decision at 242. 
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
By: Student Editorial Board 
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee Relations 
Report.  It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public 
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the 
public employee collective bargaining statutes.  
I. IERLA Developments 
A. Confidential, Managerial and Supervisory Employees 
In University Professionals of Illinois, Local 4100 and University of Illinois, 33 
PERI ¶ 73 (IELRB 2016), the IELRB held that university department chairs are not 
confidential, supervisory or managerial employees The University Professionals of 
Illinois, Local 4100, IFT-AFT,  sought to add department chairs to an existing 
bargaining unit of full-time tenured and tenure-track faculty members at the 
University of Illinois at Springfield.  The university argued that department chairs 
are not educational employees as defined by the IELRA  because of their status as 
confidential employees, supervisors, and managerial employees. 
Section 2(n) of the IELRA defines a confidential employee as “an employee, who 
(i) in the regular course of his or her duties, assists and acts in a confidential 
capacity to persons who formulate, determine and effectuate management policies 
with regard to labor relations or who (ii) in the regular course of his or her duties 
has access to information relating to the effectuation or review of the employer's 
collective bargaining policies.  The university argued that department chairs are 
confidential employees because the collective bargaining agreement provides that 
department chairs are the first step in the grievance procedure, giving them access 
to information sufficient to make them confidential employees.  However, the 
IELRB noted that the information must be strictly related to the bargaining 
process between labor and management.  The IELRB held that department chairs 
would not have access to the type of information that falls within the scope of 
confidential status, thus concluding that the department chairs area not 
confidential employees. 
The IELRA  has a three-prong test for supervisory status.  Pursuant to Section 2(g): 
1) the individual must have authority to perform supervisory functions or 
recommend such action; 2) the functions must involve the exercise of independent 
judgment rather than be clerical or routine; and 3) the individual must spend “a 
preponderance of his or her time exercising these functions.”  The university 
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argued that department chairs perform supervisory functions by directing work 
upon the scheduling of classes.  The IELRB rejected this argument and concluded 
that the chairs do not have supervisory status because the chairs do not exercise 
independent judgment when scheduling classes.  Instead, they work together with 
the faculty to create schedules.  In addition, the department chairs do not order 
faculty to teach certain classes—chairs and faculty reach decisions together. 
Finally, a managerial employee is defined under Section 2(o) of the Act as “an 
individual who is engaged predominantly in executive and management functions 
and is charged with the responsibility of directing the effectuation of such 
management policies and practices.”  The IELRB concluded that the department 
chairs are not managerial employees.  It reasoned that the chairs act as liaisons 
between deans and their respective department faculty.  The chairs do not exercise 
independent authority to determine how the university’s goals will be met. 
Therefore, because the department chairs at the University of Illinois at Springfield 
are not confidential employees, supervisors, or managerial employees, they were 
included in the bargaining unit as educational employees. 
 
II. IPLRA Developments 
A. Arbitration 
In Village of Bartonville v. Lopez, 2017 IL 120643 (Jan. 20, 2017), the Illinois 
Supreme Court held that a police officer who participated in a hearing before the 
Board of Fire and Police Commissioners was barred from “re-litigating” his 
termination through the grievance and arbitration process in his collective 
bargaining agreement.  The court reasoned that Lopez, the terminated police 
officer, could not pursue a grievance over his termination because (1) he waived 
his right to the grievance process through certain behaviors prior to and during the 
Board hearing and (2) the grievance was barred by res judicata. 
The Municipal Code provides that police officers will be offered due process, in the 
form of a hearing before the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, for all 
disciplinary actions.  A union and a municipality may agree in collective bargaining 
on an alternative form of due process, but it must be based on impartial arbitration 
and clearly articulated in the collective bargaining agreement.  Lopez’s contract 
was silent on whether discipline was arbitrable.  The court held that normally, the 
question of arbitrability of his discipline would fall under the jurisdiction of an 
arbitrator.  However, when Lopez filed for declaratory judgment that the Board 
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should not have jurisdiction over his disciplinary proceeding, he failed to raise the 
argument that jurisdiction properly lay with an arbitrator.  Further, he participated 
in the hearing (over the jurisdictional argument which was ultimately decided 
against him) and did not file his grievance until after the hearing.  All of these 
factors led the Court to decide that Lopez had waived his right to the grievance 
procedure. 
The court also held that Lopez’s grievance arbitration was barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata. Three requirements must be satisfied for res judicata to apply: (1) 
there must be a final judgment on the merits, (2) there must be identity of cause of 
action, and (3) there must be identity of parties.  Neither party disputed the third 
requirement, that the parties to both the Board hearing and the grievance 
arbitration would be the same.  The court held that the first requirement was 
satisfied because, since Lopez failed to request judicial review of the Board’s 
decision, it was a final decision on the merits.  As for the second requirement, 
Lopez argued that the grievance was a separate cause of action because only an 
arbitrator could decide the issue of just cause for termination.  However, the court 
found that the identity of cause of action was sufficiently established since both the 
Board hearing and the arbitration would rely on the same set of facts and 
accomplish the same objective (to decide if termination was proper).  The court 
also observed that if it were to allow grievance arbitrations to go forward in these 
situations, it risked the slippery slope of eventually allowing an arbitrator’s 
decision to override that of the Illinois courts.  Lopez was barred by res 
judicata from filing a grievance over his termination. 
B. Duty to Bargain 
In Skokie Firefighters Union, Local 3033 v. ILRB, 2016 IL App (1st) 152478 (Dec. 
5, 2016), the First District Appellate Court held that the Village of Skokie 
committed an unfair labor practice by submitting a permissive subject of 
bargaining to interest arbitration over the union’s objection.  At issue was 
the  process for promotion to lieutenant, which is normally governed by the Fire 
Department Promotion Act, 50 ILCS § 742/1 et seq. (Act).  The Act expressly 
provides that firefighters are free to waive the provisions in the Act in favor of other 
provisions collectively bargained with the employer.  It also expressly provides that 
in the event a union waives such rights, any bargaining over the promotion process 
will be considered a permissive subject.  The Union had waived its rights and 
negotiated its own promotion process with the Village in the 2009-2010 collective 
bargaining agreement.  When bargaining for the successor 2010-2014 agreement, 
the union proposed to follow the process in the Act.  The village ignored this 
proposal, and instead submitted a proposal of status quo to the interest 
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arbitrator.  The arbitrator, reasoning that the current system did not appear to be 
broken, found for the Village and maintained the status quo. 
Neither party disputed that the promotion process was a permissive subject of 
bargaining.  The union maintained that by insisting to impasse on a permissive 
subject that required the union to waive its statutory rights, the village committed 
an unfair labor practice.  The village insisted that, as has been held in  Wheaton 
Firefighters Union, Local 3706, 31 PERI ¶ 131 (ILRB State Panel 
2015), and Village of Bensenville, 14 PERI ¶ 2042 (ISLRB 1998), it did not commit 
an unfair labor practice merely by submitting a permissive subject to interest 
arbitration.  The ILRB State Panel sided with the village, but the court reversed 
and remanded.  Wheaton and Bensenville held that the mere submission of a 
permissive subject to the arbitrator is not an unfair labor practice because the other 
party can object, causing the arbitrator not to consider the issue.  In those 
scenarios, the objecting party is not unfairly prejudiced.  Distinguishing the case 
before it, the court held that the union was prejudiced by the arbitrator’s award of 
the status quo.  The arbitrator effectively ordered the union to waive its statutory 
right to use the Act’s promotion process. 
The key to the Court’s holding is the understanding that the union is required to 
renew its waiver under the Act with each negotiation for a successor 
agreement.  Though 
the Village had no obligation to negotiate with the Union over this permissive 
subject, . . . the Union is entitled to insist upon the baseline default rights granted to its 
members in the Promotion Act.  The Village cannot force a waiver of those rights; it can 
only negotiate with the Union for a waiver as it had done in the past. 
Because the village pressed its status quo proposal to the arbitrator when the 
Union clearly refused to relinquish its statutory right to use the process in the Act, 
the village insisted to impasse on a permissive subject, an unfair labor 
practice.  The court’s holding does not disturb the reasoning 
of Wheaton and Bensenville, but does narrow the circumstances in which an 
arbitrator can rule on permissive subjects.  The court reiterated that just because 
parties have a permissive subject in their agreement, they do not have the right to 
insist to impasse on that subject when negotiating for a successor contract.   If one 
party wishes for an arbitrator to rule on a permissive subject, the other party must 
clearly agree.  Otherwise, the court held, it will be an unfair labor practice. 
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C.  Scope of Bargaining 
In Painters District Council No. 14 v. Chicago Transit Authority, Case No. L-CA-
14-035 (ILRB Local Panel 2016), the ILRB Local Panel affirmed the Administrative 
Law Judge’s decision that the Chicago Transit Authority violated Sections 10(a)(4) 
and (1) of the IPLRA when it used video surveillance to support disciplinary action 
against employees. 
In September 2013, the CTA fired three employees for violating General Rules 
regarding personal conduct, reporting to duty, and obedience to the rules. The CTA 
determined that the employees “stole company time” and accepted pay for time 
not worked. This determination was based in part on video footage recorded from 
the CTA’s rail platform cameras (Rail Videos). 
The ALJ held that the CTA violated Sections 10(a)(4) and (1) of the Act when it 
used video footage from the Rail Videos as evidence to discharge its three 
employees. Specifically, the ALJ found that the CTA’s reliance on the Rail Videos 
unilaterally changed the employees’ terms and conditions of employment. 
To determine whether a matter is a mandatory subject of bargaining, the ALJ 
looked to =the three-part test established by Illinois Supreme Court precedent. See 
City of Belvidere v. Ill. State Labor Rel. Bd., 181 Ill. 2d 191, 692 N.E.2d 295 
(1998); Central City Educ. Assoc. v. Ill. Ed. Labor Rel. Bd., 149 Ill. 2d 496, 599 
N.E.2d 892 (1992). The first part of the test considers whether a topic concerns 
wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment of employees in the 
bargaining unit. The second prong of the test asks whether the topic is also a matter 
of inherent managerial authority. The last step of the test requires weighing the 
benefits that bargaining will have on the decision making process against the 
burdens that bargaining imposes on the employer’s authority. 
First, the CTA’s use of the Rail Videos varied the method by which it investigated 
employee misconduct. The ALJ found that the CTA changed the character of proof 
on which it relied because the CTA had never used Rail Video to support employee 
discipline. Secondly, the use of Rail Video to support the imposition of discipline 
was a matter of inherent managerial authority because it served to further the 
integrity of the CTA as a governmental entity. Third, the ALJ found that the 
benefits of bargaining over the Respondent’s disciplinary use of rail platform 
footage outweighed the burdens of bargaining on the Respondent’s inherent 
managerial authority. For example, bargaining would benefit the bargaining 
process because it would put employees on notice that they were subject to 
monitoring while off of CTA platforms. 
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The ALJ held that the CTA did not give the Union notice and an opportunity to 
bargain over its decision to use Rail Video in support of disciplinary decisions. It 
only informed the Union of its disciplinary use of rail platform footage during an 
employee’s disciplinary meeting where the footage was first presented as evidence. 
Prior to 2014, including the period of time when the three employees were 
terminated based on the Rail Video, the Union and the CTA never bargained or 
discussed the installation or the use of the surveillance cameras. It was not until 
the beginning of 2014 that the CTA and the Union engaged in bargaining over the 
CTA’s camera policy. 
As a remedy, the ALJ ordered reinstatement of the three employees. The ILRB 
modified the ALJ’s remedy. The ALJ ordered reinstatement of the three employees 
based on a premise that two of the employees retired to avoid impending 
termination. Essentially, the ALJ determined that the CTA constructively 
discharged the two employees. The ILRB held that the two employees were not 
constructively discharged and were only entitled to backpay with statutory interest 
for the suspension they served. 
 
